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Attention, Self and The Sovereignty
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Christopher Mole
In 1958, Elizabeth Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy'1 forcefuUy
launched the idea that character traits and states of mind are molally
important in ways that could not be seen from the point of view of
the contemporary moral psychology. 'ffioral philosophy', she wrote,
'should be laid aside [. . .] until we have an adequate philosophy of
psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking' (p. 1). This idea
influenced many ethicists in lds Murdoch's Oxford, and provides one of
the motives for Mu rdoch's The SovereiSnty of Good, and in pafiicular, for
Murdoch's attempt to establish that states of mind (construed broadly,
so as to include character traits) are morally important for their own síkei
that thet moral importance is not exhausted by the importance they
derive ftom the actions they misht lead one to pedorm or the states of
affairs that they might help to bring about.2
Murdoch's ideas about the moml importance of states of mind are
closely related to her views about how one ought to think of oneself'
Attention to oneself, she thinks, is a widespread source of molal failure:
'Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself';3'In the
moral life the enemy is the fat relentless e8o' (p. 51). These two aspects
of Murdoch's thought seem to be incompatible. It is natural to thjnk
that the states of mind whose moral importance Murdoch establishes
are inner occu[ences taking place on the pdvate stage of consciousness.
But this leads to the following problem. Trying to become good involves
giving attention to things of moral importance, and so, if we under-
stand the morally important states of mind to be private inne¡ occur-
rences, it involves Siving attention to pdvate inner states But this is a
form of self-directed intellectual activiry and self-dtected intellectual
activity is the very thing that Murdoch wants to chamctedze as a source
of monl failure.
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There arc at least two strategies for avoiding this problem. The first
strategy avoids the problem by taking Murdoch's view of the self to
entail something less than a com!Iete prchibition on attention to the
self. Perhaps self-directed attention comes in different forms, only some
of which are prohibited, or perhaps the prohibition on self-directed
attention only applies in certain circumstances. Samantha Vice employs
this strategy in her contdbution to this yolume. The present paper pur-
sues a different stategy. It avoids the problem by understanding the
morally important states of mind as something other than inner occur-
rences taking place on the private stage of consciousness. Vice's view is
that the strong prohibition on attention to the inner life is neither plau-
sible, nor waÍanted by Murdoch's position. My view is that we can keep
the strong prohibition on attention to the innet, but must reject the
idea that the morally important states of mind and character are inner
states, and think of them instead as b eiîg world inyolyíng.
The moral importance of the mind
The claim that the moral importance of states of mind is not exhausted
by the importance of thet effects can be interpreted in two ways: one
strong and one weak. The strong position is that (independently oftheir
effects) states of mind and character often have a qucial role in deter-
mining whether a person is doing well or badly, morally speaking. The
weak position is that states of mind and character carry some wetg}ft,
but vastly less than is caÍied by the moral importance of acts and states
of affairs. Murdoch endorses the strong position. The parable of the
mother-inlaw which is prominent in her discussion of this polnt,
establishes only the weak posìtion.
Murdoch asks us to imagine a mother-in-law who, by a process of reflec-
tion, comes to a positiye view of the daughter-in-law whom previously
she had regarded as vulgar and noisy (pp. 1G23). it is specified that the
mother-in-lawt new opinion is not accompanied by any change in out-
ward behaviour (the daughter-in-law is dead or abroad). Murdoch thinks,
and expects us to think, that there is something morally good about this
change in the mother-in-law. Si\ce, ex Lrypothesí, the only changes that
take place are changes in states of mind, it must be these states of mind
that make the moral difference, and so it must be that moral importance
attaches to states of mind in a way that does not depend on theil effects,
Thls argument for the moral importance of states of mind depends on
the fact that the case of the mother-in-law is one in which action is out
of the question. But, fo¡ that very reason, the example cannot establish
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that states of mind are morally important when the possibility of action
is in question. The parable of the mother-inlaw shows, in the very
special case of entirely mental conduct, that the question of whether
the conduct is good or bad must be answered by refelence to states of
mind or character. It does not show that states of mind are morally
important in general, only that moral importance attaches to inner
states when noth¡n8 else is at stake-
There is another argument, however, that does support the strong posi-
tion, according to which states of mind often have a crucial role in deter-
mining the morality of a person's conduct. Murdoch does not develop
this argument in any detail, but we can rcconstruct it in telms boÍowed
from the virtue-based approach to ethics that her work helped to revive.
The vifue ethicist takes the proper starting point for ethical theory to be
the fact that we should do what the virtuous agent would do werc he in
oul circumstances. We act as we should only if we act as the virtuous
agent would. The vi¡tue-ethicist tlen claims that there is not usually any
description of an acl given ín putely behqviour^l temts t}l.al allows us to set-
tle the question of whether that act is one that the vttuous agent would
do. The virtuous agent míght lie if the circumstances called for it, but
he would not lie callously. He might hurt othe$, but he would not hurt
othe6 brutally. 'It is all very well to say that "to copy a riSht action is to
act rightly"" says Murdoch, quoting stuart Hampshte's 'l,o8ic and
Appreciation',a 'but what is the folm I am supposed to copy?' (p. 29)- It
cannot be t}re lotm of behaviorl, considered independently of its moti-
vation. In order to determine whether or not an action is one that the
vùtuous agent would peform, we need a description of the action that
tells us more than is implied by a purely behavioural desqiption. We
need a desqiption that tells us about the states of mind and character
that the behaviou expresses. These states are important for determining
the morality or immoraÌity of a course of action, not because, as in the
case of the mother-in-law, we can f4ke 4w4),, the possibility of action and
retain a morally significant inner state - but because the descriptions of
action under which we consider actions morally arc already laden with
commitments to the agent's being in a certain state of min4 or having
certain character traits. Actions lose a crucial part of their moral charac-
ter if we attempt to divorce them from these commitments,
Attention to the self
The argument we have just explored does, as the parable of the mother-
inlaw cannot, provide Murdoch with a reason to believe that states oI
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mind have an important role to play in ou¡ moral thinking. It shows
that it is not mercly when nothing else is at stake that these states ate
morally important. But the argument also seems to show that Murdoch
is committed to the very un-Murdochian view that the attempt to
become good essentially inyolves attention to oneself.
The problem arises in the following way. ln order to know whether we
are acting as the virtuous agent would we need to know which aspects
of our character we are exercising. It is not enough to know that we are
hurting others, or that we are benefiting them. We need also to know
whether we are being callous or manipulative. To know these things we
must, it seems, pay close attention to ourselves. And that is precisely
w¡at Murdoch has told us we must not do.
'î}re príma facie innocence of self-directed attention
What we have iust seen is that Murdoch,s best argument for the moral
importance of states of mind entails a commitment to self_directed
attention. This does not pose a p¡oblem by itself. The problem adses
when this commitment is combined with Murdoch,s view that self_
directed attention is a source of moral failure. No problem would arise
if we were to reject that view of self-directed attention, and it is tempt_
ing simply to do so. Self-directed attention does not seem fo be a rrlol:al
failing. The folms of seìf-directed attention that we find ourselves com_
mitted to by the arguments of the previous section seem particularly
innocuous when we consider their role in the mo¡al reasoning at work
in the following example: a man is wondering whether he should tell
his wife about a minor indiscretion in his past. He rccognizes that keep_
ing the seüet is a way of being untrustworthy and so he resolves to tell
the truth. What mo\/es him is the realization that he does not want to
be the kind of person who would continue to lie. The distinctive feature
of this form of moral reasonlng is that the terms of evaluation it
employs indict the agent rather than the act.
Self-indicting formulations often sound more natural than the alter_
natives ftom which all reference to the self has been removed, and they
are not mercly verbal vadants on them. The belief that my wife ought
to be told the truth rationally motivates me to tell her the truth if I have
the desire that things be as they ought. To be motivated to act by the
belief that 'I ought to tell her,, I need only desire that I do what I ought.
The self-directed attention rcquired for this folm of motal reasoning
does not seem to be obiectionable. It may be clear that the agent who
employs this sort of reasoning is not among the best of moral reasoners.
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In our best moral thinking our reasons for acting are not provided by
concerns about oul own goodness. But this does not lead us to think
that there is an)'thing wrong with deliberately undertakirìg the task of
acting well, or with being motivated by judgements about whether one
is succeeding in that task: the self-directed attention that is required in
the making of those iudgements does not, on the face of it, ¡ule them
out of the attempt to become good, especially when, as in the example
above, the judgements are negative ones.
Our argument for the moral importance of states of mind and char-
acter ca[ies an apparent commitment to self-directed attention only to
the degree that self-directed attention flgures in the rather benign sort
of reasoning sketched above. Murdoch herself seems to realize that self-
directed attention can have a rcle in the attempt to become good, Her
own telling of the parable of the mother-in-law in fact, seems to
involve self-directed attention :
The M of the example lthe mother-in-1aw] is an intelligent and
well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving
ca¡eful and jlrst attention to an object which conftonts her. M tells
herself: "l am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced
and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am cetainly iealous. Let
me look again"
(p. 17, emphasis Murdoch's).
The mother-in-law's praiseworthy change of opinion is clearly pre-
cipitated by self-diTected attention of the sort that we met above. It is
by attending to hetself tbaT M is in a position to know that she is old-
fashioned, conventional and so on. In this passage Murdoch seems to
recognize, even to endorse, the mother-in-law's self-directed attention
as having a role in her moral progress. Why, then, does Murdoch also
seem to think that self-directed attention is a source of moral failing?
We have not yet seen any reason to think of self-directed attention in
this way. It is neither selfish nor self-aggrandizing, and, moreover, it
seems to figure in our eyeryday attempts to act well.
The rejection of self-directed attention
The self-directed attention involved in the sorts of reasoning discussed
above is prima facie inîocerÍ- It even seems to figure in Murdoch's
account of the mother-in-1aw's praiseworthy change of opinion. It is
tempting, therefore, to say that self-directed attention is not always
a source of moral failurc, and that it is morally permitted in the service
of an attempt to become good. This temptation should be resisted. For
Murdoch the struggle to be good is a struggle to keep attention øulø/
from the self: 'Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself,
(p. e1).
It is important to be clear that Murdoch does not merely think that
seÌf-directed attention has no role in the fully good life. There would be
no problem with thinking that the fully virtuous agent does not think of
himseu, while thinking that we should think of ou$elves in order to
become good. (Just as the¡e is no contradiction in thinking that a good
tennis playff gi\/es no attention to his ball-toss when serying, but that
,e need to attend to our ball-toss rather carefully in order to become good
tennis playe$.) Murdoch's claim is that self-directed attention is absent
fuoIJf ttre puTsuít of goodness, and not merely ftom the life in which
goodness has been achieved. We see this most clearly in the concluding
pages of 'The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts, in the claim
that 'although lthe humble manl is not by definition the good man per-
haps he is the kind of man most likely of all to become good (p. 101).
The thoroughgoing rejection of self-directed attention is also prominent
elsewhere: 'In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego, (p. S1).
Murdoch's thoroughgoing opposition to self-directed attention is
clear throughout T/¡e Sovereígnty of Good but ,h), does she oppose it so?
The following two passages provide some clues:
The difficulty is to keep attention fixed upon the real situation and
to prevent it retuming surreptitiously to the self with consolations of
self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair
(p.8e).
We are anxiety ddden animals. Our minds arc continualÌy active,
fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying \/eil
which partially conceals the world. Our states of consciousness differ
in quality, our fantasies and reveries are not tri\¡ial and unimportant,
they are profoundly connected with our energies and our ability to
choose and act. And if quality of consciousness matte¡s then any-
thing which alte¡s consciousness in the direction of unselfishness,
objectivity and realism is to be connected with virtue
(p.82).
The prohibition on self-dirccted attention, then, is connected to the
moral importance of accurately perceiving things as they really are. The
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accurate perception of things is cental to Murdoch's conception of the
good life, and of the movement towards it, both becal¡se it is good in
itselt and because it enables us to make the ri8ht decisions about how
to act: 'The love that bdngs the dght answer [. . .] is an exercise of justice
and realism, ar.drcally lookíng (p. 89). we shall see, in the next section,
that the connection between this imperative to accurate perception and
the prohibition on self-dtected attention is not an entircly straightfor-
ward one. But notice, for now that attempts to perceive the self are pro-
hibited, and that this is, in part, because they are attempts at a sort of
perception that is particularly unlikely to be accurate, and that is likely
to ímpaír accttacy when it comes to perceiving things other than the
self. The situation we are in is this: we have seen that a role for self-
directed attention in the attempt to become good seems to be entailed
by Murdoch's emphasis on the moral importance of states of mind, and
that the existence of such a role is incompatible with a strong prohibi-
tion on self-directed attention. We have also seen that, although it may
be tempting to reject the strong prohibition, Murdoch does not reject
it. The prcblem that we face is one that Murdoch is vividly aware of. It
is a source of much of the moral drama that animates The Níce and the
Good, published in 1968 (two years before the appearance of T¿e
Sovereignty of Good, but two years after the delivery of the lectures that
the book of that title collects). The Níce and the Good Sives an explicit
statement of our problem as a ?great paradox of morality' expedenced
by the book's protagonist, John Ducane:
\ trat Ducane was experiencing, in this form peculiar to him of imag-
ining himself as a judge, was, though this was not entirely clear in
his mind, one of the great paradoxes of morality, namelt that in
older to become good it may be necessary to imagine oneself good,
and yet such imagining may also be the very thing which rendeß
improyement impossible, either because of suÍeptitious complacency
or because of some deeper blasphemous infection which is set up
when goodness is thought about in the wrong way. To become good
it may be necessary to think about virtue, although urueflective sim-
ple people may achieve a thoughtless excellence. Ducane was in any
case highly reflectíve and had from childhood quite explicitly set
before himself the aim of becoming a good man.s
The problem that the authorial voice expresses here is the \/ery problem
that we have found in Murdoch's philosophical work. If being good is
thought of as involving vitue, then a deliberate attempt to become
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good (like Ducane's 'explicitly set[ting] before himself the aim of
becoming a good man') seems to involve self-directed attention, which
'rendeß improYement impossible'.
One way to deal with this problem is not to try to eradicate it, but
simply to embrace the conclusion that it is not possible to become good
by trying. Ducane is sometimes tempted by that view, but Murdoch has
no sympathy with it and thinks that we must account lor deliberate
intellectual attempts to pursue goodness and account for the simple
achievement of goodness. 'Ult must be possible to do iustice to both
Socrates and the virtuous peasant. In such "musts" as these lie the deep-
est springs and motives of philosophy' (p. 2).
A bad argument against self-directed attention
The escape from our problem is seen by looking more carefully at the
way in which the emphasis on 'realism and rcally looking' provides the
foundations for the prohibition on self-directed attention.
It is the imperatiye to 'realism and really looking' that leads Murdoch
to prohibit self-directed attention, but it is not that Murdoch prohibits
self-directed attention simply because the self is particularly difficult to
reallt realistically, look at. We should not interpret Murdoch in this
way because if we were to do so we would have to credit her with the
following patently invalid argument:
1. Accurate perception of the self is difficult.
2. We are morally required to perceive things accurately.
Conclusion; We are morally required not to attempt accurate pet-
ception of the self.
This argument is clearly not valid. If the first premise only cites the
difficulty of accllrate self-perception then all that follows is the entirely
unremarkable conclusion that, when it comes to the perception of the
self, the moral requirement of accurate perception is a diffrcult rcquire-
ment to meet. That does nothing to justify the vilification of self-
directed attention. The struggle to become good is, after all, a difficult
struggle.
There is a temptation to strengthen the argument by beefing up the
first premise. Murdoch sometimes seems to use an argument that is a
version of the one above, bìit one that is less obviously invalid because
the first premise has been stengthened so as to say that accurate
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seÌf-perception is not merely difficult but impossible, and that the self
prevents the accuÉte perception of other things:
That human beings are naturally selfish seems true on the evidence,
whenever and wherever we look at them, in spite of a very small
number of exceptions. About the quality of this selfishness modern
psychology has had something to tell us. The psyche is a historically
determined individuaÌ relentlessly looking after itself. [. . .] one of its
main pastimes is daydreaminS. It is reluctant to face unpleasant real-
ities. Its consciousness is not normally a transparent glass through
which it sees the world but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie
designed to protect the psyche from pain. It constantly seeks conso-
lation, either thrcugh imagined inflation of self or through fictions
of a theological nature
. (P- 76).
The 'modern psychology' that Murdoch understands as revealing this
picturc of the self is Freudian psychology, and one who thinks that
Freudian psychology is rwong-headed wi be unmoved by Murdoch's
argument herc. But even if we were to grant this picture of the self as a
soulce of fictions, we would still not have a prcmise capable of patching
the hole in the argument sketched above. Even if we believe that the self
is a source of fictions we still lack a reason for not trying to perceiye it
rightly. (A Freudian would say that we should Try to perceive it rightly.)
The premise that is needed to establish an absolute prohibition on self-
directed attention is not iust that the self is a deceiver and that accumte
self-perception is impossible. The needed premise is that the self is a
deceiver, and that its deceptions are mc de worseby f}fe aTtempt to perceive
it coÍectly. This ls a much harder premise to establish, lt is not a premise
that can be established on the basis of introspection, for to believe it on
the basis of introspection is to undemine one's on'n basis for believing it.
Nor is it a claim that is made obvious on the basis of our observations of
otheff. I^¡hen we observe othe$ we do, perhaps, find them to be some-
what deceived about the way things are, but the matter of whether they
would be any less deceived had they not tded to perceive themselves is
not a matter that our normal encounters with people, however carefully
conducted, enable us to decide. This claim is too strong to feature as an
unsupported premise in the argument against self-directed attentiol.
There are no plausible strengthenings of the fißt premise that make
the argument given above into a compelling one and so we should not
understand Murdoch's prohibition on self-directed attention to be
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motivated by this argument, or by a version of it in which the fi$t
premise is strengthened. We get a more satisfactory interpretation of
Mudoch's reasons for prohibiting self-dirccted attention by getting a
better understanding of the strength of the second premise - the prem-
ise concerning the imperative to perceive the world cofiectly.
Realism and really looking
To understand the importance of really looking we must turr once
again to the parable of the mother-inlaw. The mother-in-law's morally
praiseworthy change of opinion involved her seeing that her daughter-
inlaw is 'not vulgar, but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spon-
taneous, not noisy but gat not tiresomely juvenile but delightfulty
youthful' (p. 17). Such changes are said to result ftom'realism and really
looking'ot as Murdoch says elsewhere, ftom a'just and loving gaze
directed on an lndividual reality' (p. 33). Murdoch specifies that the
case is one in which the mother-in-law is not deluding herself. The
mother-in-law's vision is more accurate once she has revised her opin-
ion upwards. But it must be a contingent fact that in this paúicular case
the higher opinion is the more accurate one. Some daughters-in-law
really are undignified, noisy and tircsomely juvenile, and the result of
realistically looking at them would, presumabl, be to see them dr
undignified, noisy and tiresomely juvenile.
Murdoch herself has given us the verdict ftom her realism and really
looking: that human beings are naturaìly selfish seems true whenever
and wherever we look at them' (p. 77).If 'rcally looking' is valuable for
itself then it is valuable whether or not it shows us things in a good light.
In being told to /¿ally look we are notbeing invited to optimistically mis-
perceive the world; we are being asked to perceive it as it really is. 'Really
Iooking' witlì'a just and loving attention' is valuable whatevel it is that
one is doing justice to. It may be a daughter-in-law that one had under-
estimate4 or the extent of human altruism that one had overestimated.
The emphasis on resisting fantasy shows us that it is respect for the
real which is the achtul¡g impelling Murdoch to act well: 'The authority
of morals is the authority of truth, that is of rcality' (p. 88). This is not
an emotional reaction to the world as known, but the rccognition of the
world as something one must come to know (and thereby come to
understand and rcspect):
The value concepts are here lin the case of imaginative art and the
practice of a skilled claftl patently tied onto the World, they are
ll
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stretched as it were between the truth seeking mind and the t¡orld,
they are not moving about on their own as adjuncts to the personal
win [. . .]. [Wle see it as natural to the particular kind of creatures we
are that love should be inseparable from justice and clear vision ftom
respect for the real
(p.88f).
The world-involving nature of the morally important
states of mind
The emphasis on the moral importance of character and of states of
mind should be understood as an emphasis on the importance ofmodes
of attention. The value that we pußue in developing craftsmanship,
and in ou¡ engagement with the arts, is ,stretched between the truth
seeking mind and the world, (p. 88) because it is value that inheres in
attention. (There is a play on et''mology here. ,Attention, comes f¡om
the Old French ød tendere: being strctched out.) Being loving and iust,
and possessing the other vittuous chatacter traits, is not a matter of
being in a particular sort of pdvate, inner state. It depends on our mode
of engagement with the world. The facets of our character take on the
status of virtues orìly insofar as they involve particular faculties of atten_
tion that bring us into a virtuous relationship with the world.
Virtuous charactq traits involye particular ptopensities for varieties of
valuable attention, while vices are tendencies towards inattention.
Loving is (or at least, it essentially involves) an astute focus on the par_
ticulaúty of othe$. Kindness starts with an awareness of their needs.
Pity pays heed to the origins of another,s misfoúune. Courage is the
trait required for attention to produce action unimpeded. The angry
man, the lazy marr and the disrespectful man are all, in their vaúous
ways, negÌigent, careless, thoughtless, impulsive, tactless or lash, as is
shown by the ftequency with which the harm and offence they cause is
inadvertent (tendencies Murdoch explored in ]net 7971 rloveI, An
Accidental Møn). The impatient man is the fi$t to look away.
Possession of a chatactq trait is not a kind of bias in the way that
events are depicted in one,s internal monologue. There is no distinctive
profile to the inner phenomenology of acting ftom some particular
character tmit. What is distinctive about acting from a patticular char_
acter trait is one's folm of engagement with the world. It is the world
that sets the standards. In ûying to act well we must ask (as my argu_
ment in the first section demonstrated) questions about oul chatacte!
but this does not commit us to problematically self-directed attention
ChristopherMole a3
because these are not questions that can be answered by ditecting atten-
tion onto oneself. To know whether one's character is virtuous is to
know one's mode of attentive engagement with the world, and this
cannot be known by looking inwards,
The question, 'Is this act loying?' is not a question about whether the
behaviour is accompanied by a particular phenomenological twinge in
the subiect, but a question about (among other things) whether the act
does its obiect any good and whether it is motivated by a proper recog-
nition of what wouÌd do the ob¡ect good. That is why'Love needs to be
expressed, it needs to do work'.6
Reaìly looking does not get its value by rcvealing purposefulness and
pre-eústing yalue out there in the world: ,If there is any kind of sense
or unity in human life, and the dream of this does not cease to haunt
us, it l. . .l must be sought within a human expedence which has noth-
ing outside it' (p. 77). Nor does it involve an illusory projection of value
from the self. Looking at the world is ifsef a bearer of value. Knowledge
oÌ the nature of one's chatacter may be indispensable for the more or
less reflective thinke/s deliberate progressing towards becoming good,
but this knowledge of character is not attained through the worthless
unstretched-out attention invoÌved in introspection. Even when intro-
spection succeeds in being honest and astute, the features of ourselves
that we learn about through introspection are featues that are morally
salient only on account of their telationships to things outside the self.
lntrospective meditations do not bring us into a proper relationship
with the world, and they do not tell us whether we a¡e in a proper rela-
tionship with the world. It is carefuì understanding of the world that
¡eveals our failures of virtue as failures. If one takes our moral character
to be partially constituted by the ways in which we attentively interact
with the world, then one can hold that character traits are primary bear-
ers of intdnsic value without thereby making one¡s own properties a
focus of concern in one's pursuit of goodness. Insofar as the struggle to
become good requires knowledge of one's own moral character it pro-
vides a furthe¡ impetus for patient and careful attention to the world,
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